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ABSTRACT 
  
The conflict between property rights and the right of association creates 
the case for various policy avenues to ensure that employees have effective 
access to the right to associate for the purposes of collective bargaining. One such 
labour policy in Canada is first-contract arbitration. The experience of this policy 
in Quebec over the last three decades has achieved key objectives: ensuring first 
agreements for newly unionized workers, developing constructive bargaining 
relationships and overcoming what can be a major obstacle to an effective right 
to associate. After reviewing this experience, this article provides an overview of 
the unionization campaigns resulting in union certifications for the United Food 
and Commercial Workers Canada in six Wal-Mart facilities in Quebec province 
over the last six years. It then examines two recent cases of first-contract 
arbitration for these certifications. In one case, the company summarily closed 
the department concerned after the first contract was awarded. In the second 
case, the store remains open, with an operative collective agreement. Absent a 
policy of first-contract arbitration, it appears unlikely that this would be the case. 
The evolution of the bargaining relationship beyond the first-contract will 
provide a key test of the relative efficacy of Canadian policy approaches to 
ensure the freedom of association.  
 
 
abour and employment relations are one area that brings sharply 
into focus conflicts between different types of rights. Most 
democratic societies seek to protect private property, such as the 
freedom of enterprise and the freedom to contract, but such rights are never 
absolute. The abolition of slavery placed distinct limits on the notion of property 
as regards human beings. Property is similarly limited by larger community and 
social purposes, for example in the ways that urban planning regulations, the 
assessment of environmental impact or consumer protection can circumscribe 
L
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the use of property and the freedom to contract. Individual liberties also limit or 
condition property rights, as in the consideration of racial and gender equality. 
As community standards evolve, so too does the exercise of property rights since 
they are subject to those standards. This is the history of regulatory activity of 
industry which is neither new nor exceptional. Business regulation is as old, 
indeed older, than the limited liability company itself and has ever conditioned 
the exercise of property rights.  
Labour and employment rights are a good example of this historical 
pattern. Whereas employers once claimed the right to pursue their business 
strategies according to absolute principles of freedom of contract, from the 
nineteenth through to the twentieth century, such rights came to be the subject of 
a range of individual and collective rights. The core tenet is that labour is not a 
commodity like other commodities since it concerns human beings who enjoy 
rights. Pre-eminent among these is the freedom of association. Workers in most 
democratic societies are accorded the right to associate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining. This objective is at the very core of the key conventions of 
the International Labour Organization and, more recently, of its 1998 Declaration 
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. As societies emerge from periods of 
dictatorship, one of the first steps towards democracy is the effective recognition 
of the freedom of association. This is a fundamental right that has made it ways 
into core statements of constitutional rights. For example, the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (1982) guarantees to all the following freedoms: conscience 
and religion; thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication; peaceful assembly; and association. 
These rights have a pre-eminent character relative to other legislation and are 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. In a recent 2007 decision, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has enlarged its interpretation of the meaning of freedom of 
association to include collective bargaining (Fudge 2008). 
Most national labour laws seek to find some kind of balance between the 
recognition of property rights and what have come to be seen as fundamental 
human rights, including the right to associate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. There is often an empirical distance between a right in principle and 
effective access to that right. A continuing challenge for labour policy is how to 
make human rights, such as freedom of association, effective in the face of 
property rights, especially when freedom of association is a right exercised in the 
very same physical space as property rights. In democratic societies, employers 
are normally constrained from firing individuals for excising their right to 
associate and are generally obliged to recognize unions, subject to some kind of 
test as to their legitimacy, for example their representativeness. In some 
countries, the right to associate and even to strike is deemed to be an individual 
right that can be accessed at virtually any time. In other countries, notably the 
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United States and Canada, the right to associate is subject to an administrative 
determination of the majoritarian principle, i.e. it is a right that is exercised when 
there has been a demonstration of majority support.  
How you make such a demonstration is the subject of ongoing debates. If 
effective access to the right to associate for the purposes of collective bargaining 
is frustrated by employers who contest the right of their employees to engage in 
such behaviour or discriminate against those who do so or mobilize their 
company’s resources against such an objective, especially on company premises 
controlled by managers arguing against the exercise of the right to associate,  it 
would be difficult to conclude that workers in that enterprise are able to exercise 
effectively what is recognized as a fundamental right in a democratic society. 
This is, of course, the basis of robust argument to level the playing field in terms 
of union access to company premises, the nature of face-to-face and captive-
audience meetings between managers and employees, methods to determine 
representativeness that takes account of the specificity of a situation where one 
party is seeking to exercise a right (freedom of association) in a physical space 
that is subject to the direct and detailed control of another right (property), and 
many other dimensions of the unionization process (Doorey 2008), while 
ensuring that there is scope for discussion among workers about exercising their 
right to associate. In the absence of such mechanisms and significantly dissuasive 
penalties where holders of property rights transgress associational rights, it is 
difficult to ensure effective access to the freedom of association.3  
Even when employees are able to secure collective representation by a 
union, the employer can in effect refuse to deal with the union and to frustrate 
the effective exercise of the freedom of association. It’s in this context that a 
number of jurisdictions in Canada have implemented first-contract arbitration 
procedures where, in the absence of agreement on a first collective agreement, 
one of the parties can make a request for compulsory interest arbitration. The 
fundamental issue remains how to ensure an effective freedom of association. 
This article provides a brief overview of the experience of first-contract 
arbitration, with a particular focus on Quebec province and the case of Wal-Mart 
Canada Corporation and the United Food and Commercial Workers Canada 
where, to date, there have been two first-contract arbitration awards, with a 
possibility of others in the future. We first look at the operation of this legislative 
provision, then profile Wal-Mart and the Wal-Mart unionization campaigns in 
Quebec, before considering the process and results of these cases of first-contract 
arbitration. Despite the fact that Wal-Mart has closed two unionized facilities in 
Quebec since the beginning of this campaign (a store in Jonquière and a Tire & 
Lube Express department at another store in Gatineau), a collective agreement at 
its Saint-Hyacinthe store came into effect in April 2009. Simply expressed, this 
store continues to operate under the aegis of a first collective agreement and the 
sky is not falling. Given the company’s apparent reticence to deal with unions at 
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its other locations in North America, this result is no doubt of interest to those 
who are seeking to understand the role of first-contract arbitration in ensuring 
effective access to the right of association.  
 
FIRST-CONTRACT ARBITRATION AND THE FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION 
 
Employers can feel challenged, even threatened, by the exercise of the 
freedom of association with regard to their property and often seek, by all means 
possible, to frustrate the exercise of this right. Thomas Kochan (1980: 182) put it 
aptly when he suggested that a top priority for American employers is to remain 
union free and this only appears to shift when they have to learn to deal with a 
union. The North American policy norm is nonetheless an obligation to bargain 
in good faith with a legally constituted union. However, there is no obligation to 
conclude an agreement. Even when workers secure representation rights, 
employers can, if done in good faith (presuming that what this entails is easily 
ascertained), simply delay and delay and delay, until the realistic exercise of the 
right to associate is effectively frustrated. Newly unionized workers might of 
course also have inflated expectations about the ability of their employer to 
satisfy their demands. Or there may simply be such “bad blood” that it is 
difficult to constitute a bargaining relationship.  
That is why a number of Canadian jurisdictions began to experiment with 
first-contract arbitration. The 1970s gave rise to some bitter and even violent first-
contract disputes in Canada where it was clear that workers could not really 
exercise their right to bargain collectively. Paul Weiler (1980: 53), an early 
commentator on the development of this policy tool in Canada, described the 
imposition of a first contract “as a trial marriage, one which could allow the 
parties to get used to each other and lay the foundations for a more mature and 
enduring relationship”. It is meant to be “an exceptional” device (Sexton 1987), 
smoothing the way towards a more enduring relationship, where public policy 
foresees the possibility of interest arbitration in the case of a failure to resolve 
contending claims for the content of a first collective agreement.  
It’s also important to emphasize the pedagogical aspect of this public 
policy. Employers have historically had issues with the emergence of collective 
representation and, after certification has occurred, both parties have to learn to 
develop a constructive working relationship. The mediation-arbitration process 
developed in the context of first-contract arbitration encourages this heuristic by 
allowing the parties to come to agreement on core aspects of their relationship, 
by making the argument to a third-party neutral on other aspects, by listening to 
the arguments of the other party, by having the option at any time to come to an 
agreement on one or another clause of the first contract while these discussions 
are in process , by interacting with the arbitrator and reading the justifications 
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that inform the arbitration award and then by having to live and operationalize 
the results of the process. The policy demonstrates that it is possible to develop a 
working relationship, that the sky will not fall, and that the parties can actually 
take advantage of these exceptional circumstances to learn how to deal with each 
other. This is not to suggest that issues will not remain or that the relationship 
cannot evolve over time but it seems that exceptional measures are required to 
help the parties develop a constructive relationship at the outset and first-
contract arbitration offers a policy avenue to achieve this objective. The question 
cannot be an existential one, about the union’s right to exist on the employer’s 
premises, but rather about the type of relationship that can be developed 
between parties who share so many common interests about the efficient 
operation of the organization in which they work and the need for healthy and 
productive working conditions for the organization’s employees, if only they can 
learn to make the process work. 
According to the constitutional division of labour between provincial 
governments and the national government in Canadian federalism, employment 
relations are a split jurisdiction according to the industry where employees are 
located. More than 90 per cent of employees are regulated by provincial labour 
law, which gives rise to interesting variations from one province to another. The 
province of Quebec inserted a first-contract arbitration clause in its labour code 
in 1977. British Columbia experimented with the process prior to Quebec and 
seven Canadian jurisdictions now have some form of first-contract arbitration. 
Quebec, which is the second largest jurisdiction in Canada (after Ontario) in 
terms of population, uses a system of a single arbitrator with a “winger” named 
by each party to advise the arbitrator but not to participate in the decision-
making process. The arbitrator can move from the mediation to the arbitration 
phase if it appears unlikely that the parties will reach agreement (for an excellent 
overview in English, see Sexton 1987). The objective of this policy is simple: incite 
the parties to reach an agreement on their first contract without conflict and 
thereby help the parties towards a stable bargaining relationship. 
Quebec offers an especially interesting case study because there is now 
more than thirty years of experience with this legislative provision. The most 
comprehensive study of this experience of first-contract arbitration was done by 
the Quebec Ministry of Labour over the twenty-four-year period 1978 to 2001 
(Marotte and Paré 2002). It reveals a number of interesting insights. During that 
period, there were more than a thousand requests made for first-contract 
arbitration (n= 1,031), of which just over half (52.5 per cent) were granted. Of 
those that were granted (n=541), 43.1 per cent had a first agreement imposed by 
the arbitrator and 39.9 per cent signed a collective agreement of their own 
volition. The other outcomes included withdrawal of the request by the union 
(5.9 per cent) or the employer (0.2 per cent), closure of the firm (3.1 per cent), 
decertification of the union (2.6 per cent), ongoing arbitration (2.5 per cent), a 
83   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – V.15 – Special Edition – Nov. 09 
 
decision not to intervene (2.2 per cent, but exclusively before a minor legislative 
adjustment facilitating intervention in 1983), and a settlement outside of the 
arbitral process (0.4 per cent). The authors note that the possibility of arbitration 
seems to be a powerful incentive to settle in the mediation phase of the two-step 
process since 39.9 per cent of these cases actually signed an agreement during the 
process of first-contract arbitration. It should also be noted that the process 
provides that any clause on which the parties agree automatically becomes part 
of the arbitration award.  
Among the cases that were refused first-contract arbitration by the 
Minister of Labour (n= 487 or 47.2 per cent of the requests), the major reason was 
that a collective agreement was concluded by the parties (52.8 per cent). The 
other major reasons included the decertification of the union because it was no 
longer representative (18.9 per cent), the closure of the firm (7.0 per cent), the 
withdrawal of the request by the union (6.2 per cent) or the employer (0.4 per 
cent), a preference to opt for voluntary arbitration (6.2 per cent) in which case the 
parties are also responsible for the cost of the arbitration, and other unspecified 
reasons (8.6 per cent).  
The request for first-contract arbitration can be made by either party. 
Consistent with our argument that it is mainly the union side seeking to secure 
an effective exercise of freedom of association rights, it is the union that made the 
request in 81.7 percent of the cases between 1978 and 2001 (the employer did so 
in 17.7 per cent of these cases).  
A key conclusion emerging from this overview of the Quebec experience 
with first-contract arbitration is that a significant proportion of the cases 
considered, both those accepted in the process by the Minister of Labour and 
those refused, resulted in a first agreement. If we cumulate those cases resulting 
in (a) an award or (b) an agreement before reaching the award stage that were 
part of the arbitral process and (c) those cases that were refused because they had 
reached an agreement, this amounts to a conservative estimate of 68.5 per cent of 
the cases considered in the 1978-2001 period that resulted in a first contract. If we 
add those cases that opted for voluntary arbitration or reached agreement 
outside of the process or where the arbitration was ongoing, there were 72.9 
percent of cases where an agreement was likely.  
In order to ensure that the trends observed in the Ministry of Labour 
study of the 1978-2001 period hold for the most recent data available (the seven 
years spanning 2002-2008), we analyzed this later data. During the 2002-2008 
period, there were 208 cases of which 151 were admitted into the first-contract 
arbitral process and 57 were excluded. Among those included, 37.8 per cent 
reached agreement and 50.3 per cent received an arbitration award. Among those 
excluded, 66.7 per cent reached a first collective agreement. This suggests that 
the results are largely similar with a total rate of agreement on first contracts of 
82.2 per cent (including cases included in this process resulting in voluntary 
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agreements or arbitration awards and cases excluded because they reached a first 
agreement). 
Overall, when we integrate the data from the two periods for a total of 
1239 cases over the 1978-2008 period, 86.4 per cent of those admitted into the 
process either reached an agreement or received an award. When we examine 
the cases included in and excluded from the process, we estimate that in 74.5 per 
cent of cases there was either an agreement reached voluntarily (49.6 per cent) or 
an award granted (24.9 per cent).  
On the basis of this extensive experience in Quebec province, it would 
appear that first-contract arbitration is associated with powerful incentives to 
reach some form of agreement and that the policy objective of ensuring effective 
access to associational rights for the vast majority of workers concerned is 
attained.4 An interesting test case is nonetheless how this policy deals with the 
most reluctant of employers. 
 
THE CASE OF WAL-MART 
  
According to the most recent data available from the United Nations 
Agency, UNCTAD (2008), Wal-Mart Corporation was in 2006 certainly among 
the world’s most important transnational corporations. In terms of sales, it was 
second in the world (just behind ExxonMobil Corporation) and 11th overall in 
terms of foreign sales. In terms of assets, it was 15th overall and 10th in terms of its 
foreign assets. Finally, it was the largest overall employer (1.91 million workers 
worldwide) and foreign employer (540,000 employees outside of the United 
States). In terms of overall employment, it was more than four times the size of 
its nearest rivals (Siemens of Germany, McDonalds of the United States, 
Deutsche Post of Germany and Carrefour of France) and in terms of foreign 
employment it had almost half as many workers again as its nearest rival 
(McDonald’s Corporation).  
From the founding of its first store in 1962, Wal-Mart became the largest 
retailer in the United States by 1990. Its foreign expansion dates from 1991 when 
it developed a joint venture with Mexico’s largest retailer (Fishman 2006). It 
entered the Canadian market in 1994 when it purchased 122 Woolco Stores from 
the Woolworth Corporation. This purchase was notable because it excluded the 
22 Woolco stores that were either unionized (n = 10) or that had downtown 
locations (Bianco 2006). Wal-Mart Canada Corporation currently has 
approximately 312 locations and employs nearly 80,000 persons.5 Approximately 
71,000 employees in Canada are paid hourly, of which 11,500 in Quebec in 54 
different stores.  
Wal-Mart is not a corporation known for its pro-union bias. While it 
describes itself as pro-associate (a term used internally to refer to its employees) 
as opposed to anti-union, there are multiple indicators that where possible it has 
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sought to contest the legitimacy of unions and the need for a union presence in 
its operations. This has been evident in the few cases in the United States when 
there have been unionization attempts and the vigorous internal company 
policies to remain union free (Greenhouse 2008: 250). This was also the case with 
its workers in China where the company only reluctantly agreed in 2006 to deal 
with union representatives (Harney 2008: 138), reportedly after considerable 
pressure from local and national governments. 
To summarize, Wal-Mart is a global corporation with a comparatively 
recent history that has experienced a rapid expansion, both in its country of 
origin and abroad. Its commercial successes are numerous and its commercial 
failures quite rare (on the case of Germany, see Christopherson 2007). Low costs 
are an integral part of its overall strategy as a lean retailer and tight control of 
labour costs and vigorous supply-chain management are key components of that 
strategy. With its formative culture in the southern US, finding a balance 
between property rights and the freedom of association does not appear to have 
figured high on the list of its priorities. 
 
THE WAL-MART UNIONIZATION CAMPAIGN IN QUEBEC  
 
The most sustained and successful unionization campaigns of Wal-Mart 
locations in North America have taken place in Quebec province (for an 
overview of the Wal-Mart unionization campaigns in Canada up to 2005, see 
Adams 2005). As of mid-2009, these campaigns by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Canada have resulted in six successful certifications in 
three Wal-Mart stores and in three Tire & Lube departments (two linked to stores 
that were also certified and one to a store where there is no certification). Table 1 
gives an overview of the key dates and the steps in the process of these six units. 
The first certification was obtained in Jonquière Quebec, an isolated and 
heavily unionized primary resource and aluminum smelting town some two 
hundred kilometres north of Quebec City. This case made headlines across the 
globe because Wal-Mart announced the closure of the store, purportedly because 
of its non-viability, a week after the union representing the workers in this store 
applied for first-contract arbitration under Section 93 of the Quebec Labour 
Code. This case has been the source of ongoing legal battles between the union 
and employer, including individual complaints of unfair labour practices and 
psychological harassment and collective complaints about the right of the 
employer to close its store in the context of first-contract negotiations (Coutu 
2007, Vallée 2007). Although the right of the employer seemed to be well 
established on this point in Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada gave the 
union leave to appeal. The case was heard in January 2009 and a decision is 
pending. Key questions concern a range of issues related to employers 
dismissing employees for exercising their freedom of association (in a context 
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where the Supreme Court of Canada has gradually been broadening its 
interpretation of the freedom of association) and the powers available to the 
Quebec Labour Relations Commission to grant remedies should there be a 
violation of freedom of association. In the meantime, as part of the legal 
wrangling, the much delayed first-contract arbitration for the Jonquière store, 
now closed since April 2005, is always in process. 
 
Table 1:  
Unionization Campaigns Resulting in Certifications at Wal-Mart Facilities in Quebec 
 
 
Jonquière 
Gatineau – 
Maloney 
St-Hyacinthe Gatineau – Plateau 
 Store Tire & 
Lube 
Store Tire & Lube Store Tire & Lube 
UFCW 
Local 
503 486 501 501 486 and 502 486 
Certification 
application  
1) 21/12/2003 
2)  6/07/2004 
10/05/2005 4/10/2004 28/01/2005 
1) 18/03/2005  
(486) 
2) 14/05/2005  
(502) 
18/03/2005 
Card check 
/ Election 
1) Election lost 
by 8 votes 
2) Card check 
Card check Card check Card check 
1) Application 
withdrawn 
2) Card check 
Card check 
Date of 
certification  
2) 2/08/2004 30/06/2005 14/01/2005 9/03/2005 2) 17/12/2008 17/12/2008 
Request for 
first-
contract 
arbitration 
01/02/2005 20/06/2006 24/11/2005 
Regular 
negotiations 
underway 
Regular 
negotiations 
underway 
Regular 
negotiations 
underway 
First 
agreement 
awarded  
Pending 13/08/2008 8/04/2009    
Other major 
incident 
Closure 
announced: 
9/02/2005 
Supreme 
Court decision 
pending 
Closure 
announced: 
15/10/2008 
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The second and third certifications came at Wal-Mart’s Saint-Hyacinthe 
store in a commuter town of the same name roughly 50 kilometres to the east of 
Montreal. This was in some respects a surprising location because it does not 
have the same kind of union culture as a remote resource town like Jonquière. 
The certification was granted in January 2005 for the main store and in March 
2005 for the Tire & Lube department. After nine months of negotiations, the 
union representing the workers made an application for first-contract arbitration. 
In this two-step mediation and arbitration process, to which we shall return in 
greater detail below, and after constant delays and related legal cases arising 
from that and other Wal-Mart unionization campaigns, a first contract was 
awarded in April 2009. 
A next batch of three certifications came at two Tire & Lube departments 
and one Wal-Mart store in Gatineau Quebec (formerly known as Hull prior to a 
series of municipal government amalgamations), just across the Ottawa River 
from Ottawa, Canada’s national capital. Employment in Gatineau is largely 
dominated by the federal public service, which is heavily unionized. 
Applications were made in March and May 2005, intriguingly after the 
announcement of the Jonquière closure. The union reported that this actually 
worked as an incentive for potential union members at Wal-Mart’s Gatineau 
locations. An initial application was withdrawn at one store to be resubmitted 
two months later after an intensive organizing blitz and certifications were 
granted in May and June 2005.   Two of these certifications were mired in 
protracted legal wrangling, with the Supreme Court of Canada refusing to give 
leave to the appeal submitted by Wal-Mart with regard to decisions made by the 
Quebec Labour Relations Commission.  
It’s worth highlighting a few key features of these cases. First, unlike 
elsewhere in North America, there have been six separate certifications of Wal-
Mart facilities over the 2004 to 2008 period.  
Second, all of these certifications were the result of cardcheck campaigns, 
as stipulated by Quebec law, where the Labour Relations Commission 
ascertained that there was majority support. It should be emphasized that this 
support is validated in a detailed way by independent representatives of the 
Labour Relations Commission who verify that individual employees voluntarily 
signed the cards and continue to be members of the union for the purposes of 
collective bargaining. Note that there was an additional case, at Brossard Québec, 
a suburb on the south shore of Montreal, where the union lost a certification vote 
by a significant margin (149 to 51).  
Third, these campaigns have been a veritable fiesta for a number of law 
firms involved in the process. Wal-Mart’s counsel in Canada appears to have 
explored just about every legal recourse available (see Vallée 2007: 252 et passim) 
and the union’s counsel has responded in kind. The fact that the Supreme Court 
of Canada did give leave to appeal one of the decisions related to the Jonquière 
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case, for which the result is pending, also indicates that there are real issues 
related to the conflicts of rights highlighted at the outset of this article. The net 
effect of this combination of the high stakes for the parties and the substantial 
resources that they engaged in the campaign has meant that this particular series 
of applications for certification and negotiation have been tied up in legal 
wrangling. This has resulted in substantial delays, as can be seen by the length of 
time between the applications for certifications and the granting of the 
applications and also in the length of time between the applications for first-
contract arbitration and some result from this process. To take the example of the 
Gatineau-Plateau certifications, the duration between the application for 
certification and the granting of the certification was more than three years. 
Similarly, it took more than four years between the granting of certification and 
the first-contract award in the Saint-Hyacinthe store. In companies characterized 
by a relatively high turnover of employees, such as in the retail sector where 
companies like Wal-Mart operate, this means that there is considerable distance 
between the initial organizing campaign and the eventual result of that 
campaign. It also creates the opportunity to profile new employees and to make 
the argument “on the floor” about the desirability of collective representation. 
While such discussion is a normal part of legitimate discourse between 
employees, there is a danger if the employer uses the effective control of the 
workplace accruing from its property rights to stifle employee interest in 
exercising their associational rights. The clearly expressed will to associate, as 
determined by the detailed analysis of the Labour Relations Commission, will 
then have been effectively denied. 
Fourth, Wal-Mart in fact closed two operations: its Jonquière store in 2005 
at the outset of the arbitral process for a first collective agreement and its Tire & 
Lube operations in one of the Gatineau locations in 2008 when a first contact was 
awarded by the arbitrator. According to some observers, the timing of one of 
these closures was such that it had the anticipated chilling effect in the one 
certification election vote (at the Brossard store where a certification vote was 
lost by a significant margin in April 2005) but did not seem to dissuade potential 
union members from signing cards in other unionization campaigns (at the 
Gatineau store in May 2005). Moreover, it can be questioned whether these 
closures, especially that of Jonquière, did not have an overall negative impact on 
the company as its aggressive anti-union reputation ran up against community 
values in what remains one of the two most unionized provinces in Canada.  
Finally, in accordance with Quebec labour laws, two of these six 
certifications resulted in first-contract arbitration; another is pending for the 
other closed facility, which also awaits a Supreme Court decision. It’s to those 
two cases of first-contract arbitration that we now turn because they provide 
some insight into how first-contract arbitration potentially opens up space for 
exercising the freedom of association.  
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THE GATINEAU-MALONEY AGREEMENT6 
 
The Gatineau-Maloney Tire & Lube department agreement covers nine 
employees (four full-time and five part-time) who engage in a variety of basic 
maintenance operations for vehicles in a department adjacent to the main Wal-
Mart store on West Maloney Boulevard in Gatineau, Quebec. This store employs 
a total of 250 employees, including the nine in the Tire & Lube department who 
are represented by Local 486 of the United Food and Commercial Workers of 
Canada.  
In 2005, at the time of the application for certification, employees in the 
Tire & Lube department (there are 45 such departments in the 51 stores in 
Quebec) were found to form a distinct group for the purposes of collective 
representation by the Quebec Labour Relations Commission. While they have 
some points in common with other employees in the store, this group of 
technicians must each have a driver’s license, receives special training, wears 
different clothes, has little mobility within the store and has schedules and 
holiday planning managed separately from other employees.  
After the intervention of a conciliator in May and June 2006, the union 
representing these workers applied for first-contract arbitration and an 
arbitrator, who first acts as a mediator and then as an arbitrator, was named in 
August 2006 with a first meeting of this process taking place in November 2006. 
While the two parties were able to resolve the majority of clauses that would 
make up the agreement, there were five outstanding issues. These included the 
length of the first contract, the pay scale, the rate of pay for work on Boxing Day 
(December 26th), the continuation of a store performance bonus scheme for 
unionized employees, and the wages to be paid to the employee involved in the 
negotiations. By the nature of the process according to Quebec policy and 
precedent, the arbitrator must make decisions in the interests of equity and good 
faith, while taking account of comparable conditions, the evidence produced by 
the parties and a reading of what the parties would have agreed upon in the 
normal collective bargaining process (and not simply what the arbitrator might 
prefer).  
On the length of the agreement, the employer favoured a one-year 
contract while the union argued that an agreement of three years in duration in 
the light of the length of time involved and the arbitral process currently under 
way. The arbitrator opted for three years in the absence of any employer 
justification to the contrary. 
On the pay scale, the employer noted that all Tire & Lube technicians are 
part of a store-wide wage scale in Canada. The auto technicians are in Category 2 
of this scale, which starts at $8.90 an hour and is subject to annual increases over 
ten years to reach somewhere between $10.90 and $13.90 an hour, depending on 
annual evaluations which accord increases between 20 cents an hour for a 
Murray & Cuillerier   90 
 
satisfactory performance to 50 cents an hour for an exceptional performance. The 
previous experience of new employees can be recognized in their starting salary. 
It’s also Wal-Mart’s policy in Canada to respect a differential with the legal 
minimum wage rate so the starting rate for employees would not be the 
minimum rate on the company wage scale, but might begin on the next rung in 
the pay scale. The employer advocate noted however that the company would be 
willing to grant a 30 cent an hour increase on the basis of seniority (each 
anniversary of the date of hiring). The employer representative stated that if the 
arbitrator decided to change the Wal-Mart wage scale in Quebec, then the 
company would “regretfully be obliged” to close its Tire & Lube department in 
this store.  
The union hired an actuarial specialist to study comparable wage rates in 
similar operations in Quebec. He could draw on the work done by a bipartite 
committee structure (made up of employer and union representatives in the 
garage sector) that makes recommendations about regional rates of pay in this 
sector. Movement between rungs within the scale is generally on the basis of 
2,000 hours of experience in the job. On the basis of its analysis, the union 
requested a basic rate for technicians of $11.54 an hour, rising to $15.17 for the 
top of the scale, with annual cost-of-living increases anticipated for the next two 
years of the agreement. Movement from one rung to the next would be on the 
basis of experience (in blocks of 2,000 hours).  
A key issue therefore concerned the comparator groups, notably in an 
institutional context where there is an administrative decree determining the 
working conditions of persons employed in garages doing this kind of work in 
different regions of Quebec.7 The company did not believe that the decree system 
offered appropriate comparisons. The union made the contrary argument but 
opted for the average wage of the decree system, arguing that the employer 
would not have accepted the highest rate, nor the union the lowest, and added a 
projected wage increase that reflected the overall rate of wage increases in 
Quebec in subsequent years of the agreement. The arbitrator found in favour the 
union position with regard to the scale, the annual increases and the progression 
from one rung to the next on the basis of hours worked (with the exception that 
the arbitrator stipulated that it be the number of hours really worked).  In 
particular, he emphasized that the Wal-Mart business model, which the 
employer argued would have to be maintained, must henceforth take account of 
the particular conditions prevailing in the garage sector in Quebec, but that the 
employer could use other clauses in the collective agreement to signal 
performance problems to individual employees.  A key argument was that Wal-
Mart was already observing the scales determined by the decree in the regions 
where it was in effect. 
The employer position on working on holidays was that it should be at 
regular pay since, according to the company’s vice-president of human 
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resources, they should receive regular pay unless it is a legal holiday in which 
case they receive time and a half. The employer representative noted that if it 
was necessary to pay time and half on the 26th of December, the employer could 
decide not to open the Tire & Lube department on that day. The union 
maintained that the decrees in this sector provide for time and a half payment on 
the 26th of December and the arbitrator ruled in favour of the union argument. 
On the store performance bonus scheme, which varies from one location 
to the next, the employer representative noted that it is a way to recognize the 
loyalty and interest of employees in store performance and that all employees in 
each store are treated equally on this count. However, since the employees in the 
Tire & Lube department had opted to be unionized, the employer’s criteria to be 
eligible for the bonus were no longer being met. The union argued that the 
employer was simply seeking to punish employees who had opted to unionize 
and that this was illegal and an affront to the freedom of association. The 
arbitrator ruled that all employees, unionized or not, contribute to the financial 
success of the store and should be included in the bonus scheme. 
On the payment of the employee participating in the first-contract 
negotiation and arbitration process, the union argued that the employer’s 
position not to pay that person was untenable. 
Moreover, the union counsel also deplored an employer complaint that 
the employees were not participating in the arbitration process. This suggested, 
according to the union representative, an unwillingness to recognize the nature 
of the collective bargaining process. The arbitrator found in favour of the 
payment of the employee representative involved in face-to-face negotiation with 
employer representatives during regular working hours. 
It’s clear that the arbitrator was not impressed by the arguments put 
forward by Wal-Mart and its representatives with regard to the non-
comparability of its operations to others working in this sector. Nor could the 
employer make a convincing case to exclude unionized employees from the store 
performance bonus scheme or not to pay the employee involved in direct wage 
negotiations. In essence, the arbitrator found in favour of the union on all the 
contentious issues. There was clearly a culture shock in terms of the company’s 
business model, despite the clearly expressed threat to close this department if 
the arbitrator found in favour of the union’s position on pay.  
This culture shock continued well beyond the arbitration award. Two 
months later, Wal-Mart closed its Tire & Lube operations at the Gatineau-
Maloney store, noting that the award was completely unrealistic and would 
entail an increase in prices. However, it offered the employees concerned the 
possibility of a transfer to the main store or to another Tire & Lube operation in 
the region (Mercier 2008). For the union, this was further proof that Wal-Mart 
did not respect Quebec’s labour laws, especially as it was already obliged to pay 
similar wages in other regions where there was a regional decree for employees 
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in this sector, and that it sought to send an anti-union message to any other 
employees thinking about unionizing.  
 
THE SAINT-HYACINTHE MAIN STORE AGREEMENT8 
 
In contrast to the previous case, the Saint-Hyacinthe first-contract 
arbitration concerned the main store. After certification in January 2005 and 11 
months of negotiation, Local 501 of the United Food and Commercial Workers of 
Canada made a request for first contract arbitration for the 180 employees (of 
which roughly half work full-time) in this unit. In December 2005, the Minister of 
Labour named the same arbitrator as in the Gatineau Tire & Lube department. 
He would again act as mediator and arbitrator. During the six mediations 
sessions, the parties reached agreement on many aspects of the collective 
agreement. There were four outstanding issues: three of which (wages and pay 
scales, overtime hours for the 26th of December and the coverage of the store 
performance bonus scheme) were similar to the issues considered in the 
Gatineau arbitration and one (dental benefits) was different. There followed 15 
days of arbitral hearings on these issues. The entire process was characterized by 
long delays because of the difficulty of finding dates where the parties were 
available.  
The arbitrator emphasized that there had been a clear will and an evident 
openness of mind on the part of the employer and the union to reach an 
agreement on the content of the collective agreement. It’s also important to 
highlight that this first collective agreement contains many of the basic features 
of agreements that are common to unionized workplaces in North America and 
the majority of its content was determined through the bargaining process. These 
include a mission statement that the agreement seeks to foster cooperation 
harmony, communication and efficient customer service while establishing 
wages, hours and other working conditions for those covered by the agreement. 
It also recognizes a number of basic union and employee rights, notably that the 
union is the exclusive bargaining agent for the workers concerned and that 
employees outside of the bargaining unit will not do the work of those covered 
by the agreement. The agreement also recognizes management’s rights to run its 
business, subject to the limits established by the collective agreement. Perhaps 
most significantly, the agreement establishes disciplinary procedures and a 
grievance procedure leading to third-party arbitration in the case of a failure to 
agree. The parties also reached agreement on working hours, breaks and 
overtime, the number of holidays and other paid days off during the year, the 
possibility of unpaid absences and maternity leave, and most benefits except 
dental, including time and half plus regular wages for work on a statutory 
holiday and the two-year duration of the first collective agreement. In broader 
terms, the union is also present to represent employees.  
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In terms of the issues considered by the arbitrator, the wage scale and 
progression within it were undoubtedly key issues in the arbitral process. As in 
the Gatineau case, the union argued that there should be four rungs on the pay 
scale (with small differences between each) and sought to establish the principle 
of an automatic progression through each scale on the basis of the number of 
hours worked. Workers at the lowest rung would start at a rate 10 cents more 
than the minimum wage and the differential between the top and the bottom of 
such a scale would be $6.00. Should provincial minimum wage rates be 
increased, the wage scales would be adjusted automatically. The union also 
requested a 40 cent bonus per hour worked since the request for certification was 
made. In contrast, the employer made the argument that progression through the 
scale should be the result of managerial evaluations of employee performance 
and the amount of increases can vary from no increase whatsoever to 50 cents an 
hour in the case of exceptional performance (the current average increase being 
approximately 30 cents an hour per year, according to management testimony). 
The arbitrator in this case placed much greater emphasis on his role of making 
decisions in relation to what the parties might themselves have concluded and 
not in relation to what he may or may not feel is appropriate. He noted that the 
arbitrator must be particularly cognoscente of the fact that recourse to a strike or 
lock-out is not possible, which limits radical departures in the case of an imposed 
first contract agreement. Of particular relevance, in terms of wages, is the 
question of relevant comparators. This refers to issues of both internal and 
external equity. External equity need take account of the industry as a whole and 
competitors in the same region.  Internal equity concerns other establishments of 
the same firm, be they unionized or not.  The arbitrator must also take account of 
the evidence produced by the parties in the arbitral process. 
The basic issue was whether the Saint-Hyacinthe store should be 
compared with a general goods distribution store or as a food distribution store 
such as the many chains serving the retail food industry. Contradictory evidence 
was presented on the part of both parties, the employer making the case for a 
general goods comparison and the union the case for retail food comparisons, 
which are much more likely to be unionized. The process included seven visits to 
possible comparator stores. The union evidence sought to make the case for 
overall convergence within the industry and that the leading retail food chains 
increasingly took on a generalist mandate. The arbitrator noted from the 
evidence that just 5 per cent of the surface of the Wal-Mart Saint-Hyacinthe store 
was dedicated to food and this did not include any fresh produce, whereas 60 
per cent of the surface of comparator stores favoured by the union offered food 
products. The arbitrator therefore concluded that the most logical comparator 
would be that of a general goods store such as Zellers and not a long-time 
unionized retail food store where the union was already present. The arbitrator’s 
justification concerned both the type of goods sold and the length of opening 
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hours (in Quebec, longer opening hours are permitted in retail food than in 
general goods). 
In contrast to the Gatineau case, the same arbitrator rejected a change in 
the progression through the wage scale of the type advocated by the union 
because this would constitute too radical a change with the employer’s existing 
business model and suggested that this be the subject of future negotiations. The 
arbitrator therefore found that the wage scale suggested by the employer should 
be applied. However, in keeping with the view that the parties would have 
normally arrived at a similar conclusion and that the union would have sought 
to negotiate a wage increase, the arbitrator concluded that there should be a 30 
cent wage increase for each of the two years of the agreement. 
As regards two of the other outstanding issues, whether work on the 26th 
of December would be paid regular wages or at an overtime rate plus their 
regular pay and the store-performance bonus scheme, the arbitrator came to the 
same conclusions as in the Gatineau case. Indeed, the arbitrator found that the 
employer suggestion to exclude unionized employees from this scheme was 
capricious and that this bonus should be maintained for the duration of the 
collective agreement. 
Finally, as to whether the employer would make a contribution to the 
union-sponsored dental plan or maintain only the existing employer program, 
the arbitrator decided that it would not be appropriate, given his role in a first 
agreement, to unbundle the employer’s combined health and dental plans in a 
way that favoured the union plan and therefore found for the employer.  
In contrast to the Gatineau arbitration award, the Saint-Hyacinthe award 
was largely in favour of the employer positions. Both awards hinged on 
considerations of external equity but the Saint-Hyacinthe store award put much 
greater emphasis on consistency with the existing business model in the absence 
of any other compelling factors. It’s clear that the presence of a well established 
institutional framework (through the decree system) targeting the same kinds of 
workers that were certified for the purposes of collective bargaining in the 
Gatineau Tire & Lube and the fact that Wal-Mart actually observed these rates of 
pay in regions where the decree was in effect in the garage sector were major 
determinants of the Gatineau award. External comparisons were also a major 
consideration for the Saint-Hyacinthe award. Here the arbitrator proved much 
more amenable to the employer arguments about the appropriate comparisons. 
This was the key to determining what the parties, of their own volition, might 
have agreed upon. The arbitrator did, however, discount what he viewed as a 
gratuitous anti-union position with regard to store performance bonus schemes. 
In as much as the arbitrator makes no mention of company threats to close the 
store in his Saint-Hyacinthe award, a threat that characterized the Gatineau first-
contract arbitration proceedings seems to have disappeared from the Saint-
Hyacinthe arbitral process.  
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The question therefore is how the employer will act in this newly 
unionized store for which there is a collective agreement in place until April 
2011. Paradoxically, the employer victory on key points in this reward creates 
somewhat of a quandary. Is it still possible to argue that a collective agreement is 
incompatible with the Wal-Mart business model when the arbitrator of this first 
collective agreement has sought to demonstrate exactly the contrary in the 
award? We can only speculate as to whether or not this was exactly the 
arbitrator’s intention.  
Of course, given high rates of turnover and the effective control of the 
day-to-day work climate in the store, there can be subtle pressures to undermine 
the legitimacy of the union and to seek a decertification in the window of 
opportunity provided by the Quebec Labour Code prior to the expiry of the 
current collective agreement in 2011. However, negotiations and/or first-contract 
arbitration are also underway in four other certification units. Nor is it 
impossible that other facilities make certification applications.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To our knowledge, few North American employers welcome potential 
union representatives onto their premises and suggest that they would be 
delighted to see their employees exercise their right of association should they 
wish to take the opportunity to do so. In the absence of such an approach, the 
question of how to use public policy to ensure effective access to the right of 
association, in the face of competing and sometimes contradictory property 
rights and the question of how to promote the development of constructive 
bargaining relationships that can stand the test of time remain entirely relevant. 
Among a number of policy avenues, including multiple ways of ensuring 
effective access to union certification, first-contract arbitration provides one 
important way of achieving effective access to the right of association, as was 
demonstrated by our overview of the Quebec experience over the last three 
decades.  
The Wal-Mart cases presented in this article represent an interesting test 
of this important feature of Canadian labour law. Against a backdrop of the 
closure of two unionized facilities in Quebec (the Jonquière store and the 
Gatineau-Maloney Tire & Lube department), most significant no doubt is that 
there is currently a collective agreement covering the 180 employees in the Saint-
Hyacinthe store. In broader terms, the union is also present to represent 
employees in other forums, such as health and safety and indemnities for 
occupational injuries, and to be a collective voice on these and other issues which 
might concern them.  
Irrespective of the variations observed in the two decisions presented 
above and the reasons mobilized for these variations, this agreement does not 
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seem to be incompatible with the company’s business model and the employer 
representatives’ attempts to arbitrarily exclude union members from 
performance pay were summarily dismissed by the arbitrator. In the absence of 
the first-contract arbitration policy instrument, determined employer resistance 
and the simple brandishing of a hypothetical incompatibility of union presence 
with a business model might well have provided the justification to stall 
negotiations indefinitely. The first-contract arbitration provisions in the Quebec 
Labour Code effectively removed this possibility and offered the first steps 
towards a working relationship. The result is therefore an instructive one for 
other North American jurisdictions seeking to assess a variety of policy 
instruments, once certification has been obtained, in order to ensure effective 
access to the right of association. 
The key test over the longer term will come in the ability to maintain and 
develop a bargaining relationship beyond the imposition of a first contract. The 
issues related to freedom of association are not about to disappear. If holders of 
property rights cannot live with the kinds of accommodation that Canadian 
legislation seeks to broker between property rights and the fundamental right to 
associate, including bargaining collectively over working conditions, then no 
doubt civil society and judicial pressures will be required to achieve more robust 
policy measures that ensure effective access to this fundamental right.  
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1. Gregor Murray (Gregor.Murray@umontreal.ca) is professor in the School of Industrial Relations at 
Université de Montréal, Canada Research Chair on Globalization and Work and director of the 
Interuniversity Research Centre on Globalization and Work (CRIMT, www.crimt.org). 
2. Joelle Cuillerier is in the graduate program in the School of Industrial Relations at Université de 
Montréal, where she is completing an MA degree. She has also been the acting administrative 
coordinator in the Interuniversity Research Centre on Globalization and Work (CRIMT, 
www.crimt.org). 
3 . For an historical overview of similarities and differences in labour policy approaches in Canada and 
the United States, see Gottlieb Taras 1997.  
4. There is altogether less information on what happens to these first-contract settlements beyond the 
first agreement. A 1987 study by Jean Sexton looked at the 88 first-contract arbitration awards 
between 1978 and 1984 (the first seven years of the legislative provisions). Examining these cases 
qualitatively (but excluding where voluntary agreement was reached) and on the basis of responses 
for 72 of the 88 cases, he found that there were twenty-three cases where the agreement had been 
renewed at least once, that that there were sixteen awards still in force and another four where 
bargaining was under way. In other words, the vital signs of collective bargaining were evident in 
59.7 per cent of the cases observed with decertification occurring in 22.2 per cent of cases and closure 
(in a context of a severe recession in the early 1980s) in 13.9 per cent of cases. 
5. (Wal-Mart Canada Fact Sheet 31 May 2009) (http://www.walmart.ca/Canada-About_Walmart.jsp). 
6.  Interest Arbitration, Arbitration award, first collective agreement. Wal-Mart Canada Corp. Établissement 
du 640, Boulevard Maloney Ouest, Gatineau (Québec) AM-2000-6273 et Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de 
l’alimentation et du commerce, Section locale 486 (FTQ), before the arbitrator Me Alain Corriveau, 13 
August 2008. 
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7. In Québec a collective agreement decree is a decree whereby the government imposes the application 
of the provisions of a collective agreement signed by a group of employees on other employees in the 
same field of activity.  See Jalette, Charest and Vallée (2002) and Murray, Lévesque and Vallée (2000). 
8.  Interest Arbitration, Arbitration award, first collective agreement. La Compagnie Wal-Mart du Canada. 
Établissement de Saint-Hyacinthe (Québec) et Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l’alimentation et du 
commerce, Section locale 501 (FTQ), before the arbitrator Me Alain Corriveau, 8 April 2009. 
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